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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 43

WILLS-NECESSITY OF SIGNATURE-STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS SATISBY TYPEWRITTEN NAME-Testatrix, having predeceased her husband by
three hours, was believed to have died intestate, and her property passed to her
husband's estate. Appellee, mother of testatrix, .filed a claim against the estate
for money owed by her daughter and son-in-law. A year after her claim had
been settled by appellants, appellee .filed for probate testatrix's will, in which
appellee was named the sole legatee. The signature affixed to the instrument was
not in the handwriting of testatrix but consisted only of her typewritten name,
which testatrix had acknowledged as her signature before two witnesses on
separate occasions. The lower court admitted the will to probate, holding that
a typewritten name, if properly witnessed, constituted a sufficient signature to
comply with the requirement of the Texas will statute. 1 Held, affirmed.
Zaruba v. Schumaker, (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) 178 S.W. (2d) 542.
Though no signature was required under the original wills act,2 most states
now have statutes requiring fhe signature of the testator to effectively pass either
personalty or realty. 3 This requirement of signature, however, has been loosely
interpreted by. the courts. Signatures are sustained even though the name is
illegible, misspelled, or incomplete. 4 In fact, most courts have held even a mark or
FIED

absolute Box considered it a mortgage and conveyed to defendant. Defendant agreed
to hold the land and the proceeds in case of sale in trust for the plaintiff, but later refused to keep his promise. The court said, "Assuming that the land was conveyed to
the defendant upon an oral trust, invalid under the statute of frauds and of uses and
trusts, ... yet it was lawful for him to perform it, and he has fully performed it, so
far as it required him to dispose of the land .... Though the statutes might have justified the defendant's refusal to dispose of the land as he had orally agreed, yet, :(laving
disposed ·of it, he has voluntarily emerged from the field of their protection and exposed himself to the law, which deals with him as a trustee of personal property realized for plaintiff's benefit ..."
1
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1925), art. 8283 provides, "Every last will and
testament except where otherwise provided by law, shall be in writing and signed by
the testator or by some other person by his direction and in his presence, and shall, if
not wholly written by himself, be attested by two or more credible witnesses above the
age of 14 years, subscribing their names thereto in the presence of the testator."
2
Doe v. Pattison, 2 Black£. (Ind.) 417 (1831); Avery v. Pixley, 4 Mass. 460
( I 808). The original English statute of frauds, copied to a great extent in most
American jurisdictions, provided that a devise of reality should be "signed by the party
so devising the same or by some other person in his presence and by his express
direction." 29 Car. II, c. 3, § 5 (1677).
As to personalty, the statute of frauds required the will to be in writing unless it
came within the general exceptions outlined in the statute, but it did not require a
signature by testator.
8
Bruce v. Sierra, 175 Ala. 517, 57 S. 709 (1912); In re Seaman's Estate, 146
Cal. 455, 80 P. 700 (1905); In re Carey's Estate, 56 Colo. 77, 136 P. 1175 (1913);
Martin v. Martin, 334 Ill. 115, 165 N.E. 644 (1929); In re Brennan's Estate, 244
Pa. 574, 91 A. 220 (1914); Remington v. Metropolitan Savings Bank of Baltimore,
76 Md. 546, 25 A. 666 (1893); Clay v. Layton, 134 Mich. 317, 96 N.W. 458
(1903). In re Charles's Estate, 118 Neb. 634, 225 N.W. 869 (1929).
4
ln re lverson's Estate, 39 Wyo. 482, 273 P. 684 (1929) the court declared
"Mere illegibility of signature, intended and adopted by testator as his and made while
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seal sufficient, 5 although some courts sustain them as signatures only where the
testator is illiterate or physically incapable of writing his name. 6 Nor does it
matter how the signature is affixed to the document. Besides being written in
ink, the signature may be written by pencil, engraved and applied by a rubber
stamp, printed by lithograph, and, as held by the court in the principal case,
written by typewriter.7 The testator's hand may even be guided by another
when he subscribes his name or makes his mark,8 but if the testator is unable to
complete the signature he has started, it is not a valid signing. 9 The test applied by the courts is whether the mark or writing affixed to the will was
intended by the testator to be his signature and to thereby authenticate the document as his last will and testament. In the principal case the court rested its
decision mainly on the fact that typewritten names have been sustained as valid
and binding signatures when affixed to deeds, bonds, and other legal documents,
and by analogy, should be so regarded when affixed to wills. It should be noted
that there exists in the case of wills, as distinguished from other legal documents,
an added danger of fraud in that the alleged maker is not living to deny the
execution of the instrument. However, the case is in step with the present trend
of judicial decisions towards the eventual abandonment of the requirement of
testator's signature.10
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in possession of his faculties, does not prevent it from being legal signature of will."
Succession of Bradford, I 24 La. 44, 49 S. 972 ( I 909) where the testator signed his
true name of J. W. Bradford as "J. W. Bradfor"; In Kimmel's Estate, 278 Pa. 435,
123 A. 405 (1924) the court sustained merely the signature "Father." In Quimby v.
Greenhawk, 166 Md. 335, 171 A. 59 (1933) the initials only were held sufficient,
though the last name was later added by another.
5
ln re Mueller's Will, 188 Wis. 183, 205 N.W. 814 (1925); In re Severance's
Will, 96 Misc. 384, 161 N.Y.S. 452 (1916).
6
In re Guilfoyle's Will, 96 Cal. 598, 31 P. 553 (1892); Rook v. Wilson, 142
Ind. 24, 41 N.E. 311 (1895); Succession of Gauthreaux, 173 La. 993, 139 S. 322
(1936).
7
Knox's Estate, 131 Pa. 220, I 8 A. 1021 ( I 890 )-the signature of testator was
written in pencil; In re Bullivant's Will, 82 N.J. Eq. 340, 88 A. 1093 {i913)signature was affixed by a rubber stamp; In re Romaniw's Will, 296 N.Y.S. 925, 163
Misc. 48 I at 48 8 ( I 93 7) the court declared "a signature [ to a written instrument
such as a will] if adopted as such, generally may be printed, lithographed, or typewritten as well as written."
8
In re Clark's Estate, 170 Cal. 418, 149 P. 828 ( 1915); In re Jernsberg's Esta~e,
153 Minn. 458, 190 N.W. 990 (1922). In re Miller's Estate, 37 Mont. 545, 97 P.
935 (1908). Fritz v. Truner, 46 N.J. Eq. 515, 22 A. 125 (1890); Sheehan v. Kearney, 82 Miss. 688, 21 S. 41 (1896).
9
In re Plate's Estate, 148 Pa. 55, 23 A. 1038 (1892) the testator collapsed after
finishing first stroke of his name; In Everhart v. Everhart, (Cir. Ct. Miss. 1888) 34 F.
82 the testator completed only a small scratch.
10
See "The Rule in Lemayne v. Stanley," in 29 MrcH. L. REv. 685 (1931)
where Professor Philip Mechem suggests that the statutory requirement of testator's
signature should be repealed. He submits that the statutes should only require the
courts to determine two factors: (a) whether the testator made it clear to the witnesses
that he adopted the instrument as his will and (b) whether the witnesses had attested
this fact by writing their names on the will.

